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Abstract
We investigate whether available enforcement mechanisms a¤ects who shares risk with
whom in sub-Saharan Africa by applying dyadic regression analysis to data from a lab-type
experiment, surveys and a genealogical mapping exercise. During the experiment participants
were invited to form risk sharing groups under three enforcement mechanisms: external,
intrinsic, and extrinsic, i.e., social sanctioning. Same sex dyads and dyads who belong to
the same economic community-based organizations (CBOs) are more likely to share risk.
However, when social sanctioning is possible, co-members in economic CBOs withdraw from
group formation and co-religion and marriage ties come to the fore.
We thank Trudy Owens for making available some of the survey data used in our analysis. We beneted
from useful comments from Stefan Dercon, Tessa Bold, Garance Genicot, and Orazio Atanasio, as well as from
participants in the 2008 CSAE Conference and from seminar participants at Boston University and the Universities
of Nottingham and Auvergne. The support of the Economic and Social Research Council (UK), the Department
for international Development and the Netherlands Organisation for Scientic Research (NWO/WOTRO) is
gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.
yOxford Department of International Development, University of Oxford
zDepartment of Economics, University of Oxford, Manor Road, Oxford OX1 3UQ. Email:
marcel:fafchamps@economics:ox:ac:uk. Fax: +44(0)1865-281447. Tel: +44(0)1865-281446.
1
1 Introduction
It is common for households to pool or share risk, for instance through mutual insurance
arrangements (e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig 2001, Fafchamps and Lund 2003, De Weerdt and
Fafchamps 2007) and group loans with joint liability (e.g. Besley and Coate 1995, Ghatak 2000,
Ghatak 1999, Morduch 1999). The way in which risk sharing arrangements are enforced varies
with the institutional and legal environment. Informal arrangements are thought to be en-
forced through a mix of quid pro quo, altruism, and adherence to social norms (e.g. Coate and
Ravallion 1993, Cox and Fafchamps 2007, Platteau 1994). Formal arrangements, such as in-
surance contracts and funeral societies, combine the above with external enforcement through
courts and other adjudication processes (e.g. De Weerdt and Dercon 2006, De Weerdt, Dercon,
Bold and Pankhurst 2006). What remains unclear is whether and how the nature of the available
enforcement mechanisms a¤ects who shares risk with whom. We investigate this issue using a
laboratory-type experiment designed specically for this purpose and conducted in the eld.
Following the seminal work of Kimball (1988) and Coate and Ravallion (1993), the theo-
retical literature has modelled informal risk sharing as a repeated game, in some cases, be-
tween self-interested parties (e.g. Kocherlakota 1996, Ligon, Thomas and Worrall 2001, Foster
and Rosenzweig 2001) and, in others, between parties who are intrinsically motivated by feel-
ings of altruism and anticipated guilt (e.g. Altonji, Hayashi and Kotliko¤ 1992, Ravallion and
Dearden 1988, Cox 1987, Cox, Eser and Jimenez 1998, Cox and Fafchamps 2007). This theo-
retical literature predicts that external enforcement overcomes the limitations imposed by de-
pendency on intrinsic incentives and social enforcement. Consequently, it facilitates risk sharing
between individuals who have little knowledge of one another and who neither trust nor care
about one anothers wellbeing.1
1Genicot and Ray (2003) and Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2004) discuss the limitations imposed by self-
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The primary purpose of this paper is to seek empirical support for predictions derived from
this literature using data from a controlled behavioral experiment conducted in rural Zimbabwe.
The advantage of using an experimental approach is that it facilitates causal inference. This
is because the possible e¤ect of who groups with whom on the enforcement mechanism that
emerges is ruled out by design, leaving only the e¤ect of the latter on the former to be identied.
However, the approach requires that the participating subjects be placed in a somewhat articial
decision-making environment. This may cast doubt on whether the behavior observed during
the experiment bears any resemblance to the corresponding behavior as it naturally arises (e.g.
Bardsley 2005, Levitt and List 2007). We aim to minimize this potential drawback in three ways.
First, the experimental subjects are villagers who are known to engage in informal risk sharing.
Second, each experimental session is conducted in a single village to ensure that the participants
interact with people they already know. Third, the experiment is designed to allow face-to-face,
rather than anonymous, interaction. A comparison of behavior within the experiment with real
risk sharing within a sub-sample of villages indicates that these measures are at least partially
successful (Barr and Genicot 2008).
The experiment involves two rounds, played over two consecutive days. In the rst round,
participants independently play a version of Binswangers gamble choice game (Binswanger
1980). In the second round, participants play the game a second time but are o¤ered, ex ante,
the opportunity to form risk sharing groups. Within each group the proceeds of all members
gambles are shared equally. The institutional environment and, hence, the set of available
enforcement mechanisms, is varied across three treatments applied during the second round.
In the rst treatment, agreements to share winnings are externally enforced by the exper-
imenter. In the second treatment, participants can secretly defect from an agreement after
enforcement on the formation of risk sharing networks.
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observing the outcome of their own gamble. This implies that agreements are enforced only by
intrinsic motivations (e.g., altruism and guilt). In the third treatment, participants can defect
from an agreement after observing the outcome of their own gamble, but they have to pub-
licly conrm their defection to everyone in the session. This implies that extrinsic incentives
in the form of social sanctions (e.g., shaming, threatened exclusion) can be brought to bear as
additional incentives to deter defection.
Using the data generated by the experiment, Barr and Genicot (2008) show that individuals
are most likely to enter into risk sharing agreements when those agreements are externally
enforced, although even then many potentially benecial agreements are not entered into.2
They also show that it is only under external enforcement that group formers engage in more
risk taking. Further, in disagreement with the theoretical literature cited above, they nd that
individuals are least likely to enter into risk sharing arrangements in the third treatment. They
go on to show that this third nding is consistent with two possible theoretical explanations:
either social sanctions, in the form of full or partial exclusion, are costly to inict; or individuals
su¤er from time-inconsistent preferences. However, they do not test either of these theories.
In contrast to Barr and Genicot (2008), the focus of this paper is on who commits to share
risk with whom under each of the three treatments. We investigate this by combining the
experimental data with information from two surveys and a genealogical mapping exercise that
focus on the same sample of households. These additional sources of information provide a
rich description of the economic and social contexts of the experimental participants, including
data on the kinship and marriage ties they share, and the various churches and community
based organizations (CBOs) to which they belong. To our knowledge, this is the rst time that
2Barr and Genicots probit model for the individual decision to join a group in the experiment shows that the
institutional (treatment) and regional environment (research area) are important predictors of group formation.
The sex and education level of the participant also have marginal e¤ects, while other individual characteristics
such as age, being a household head and being married do not a¤ect group formation.
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experimental data on group formation has been so richly complemented by pre-collected survey
and genealogical information.
Our ndings can be summarized as follows. In general, a pair of individuals is more likely to
share risk the more similar they are in terms of age and gender. Belonging to the same religious
group and being related by marriage support enforcement through social sanctioning, possibly
because each is associated with behavioral rules that are traditionally enforced through status
manipulation, shame and guilt. In contrast, while co-members in economic CBOs are highly
likely to group together when risk sharing relations are enforced either externally or by intrinsic
incentives, they tend not to group together when social sanctions can be brought into play.
This is consistent with social sanctions being costly to both sanctioners and sanctionees when
applied within the context of these relationships because it would undermine the functioning of
the organizations to which both belong.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 by presenting the experimental
design. In section 3, we draw on existing theory to develop a set of predictions about who groups
with whom in various contract enforcement environments. In section 4, we describe our testing
strategy. Data sources and variable construction are discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, we
present summary statistics relating to the experiment and, in Section 7 we present the empirical
results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Experimental design
The experiment is based on a simple gamble choice game played with villagers in 14 di¤erent
villages. In every village, each household is invited to send one adult, preferably the household
head or his/her spouse, to participate in the games played in their village. Each participant
plays the game twice, once on the rst day and a second time the next day. Each round takes
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between one and two hours.
In each round, each participant is interviewed privately and asked to select one of six possible
gambles g, ranked from the least (1) to the most risky (6). The gamble choice set is the same
for all participants. Riskier gambles have higher expected returns. A similar game structure
was originally used by Binswanger (1980) to elicit risk preferences; the choice of gamble implies
a range of possible values for the individuals coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The gambles
used in our experiment are presented in Table 1 together with the implied ranges of the risk
aversion coe¢ cient.3
On the rst day, each participant plays the game individually and winnings are distributed at
the end of play. At the end of the rst days round, participants are told to come back the next
day to play the game a second time. They are informed that the next day, before choosing their
gambles, they can if they wish form groups with other participants and that those in a group
will share second day winnings equally.4 There are no restrictions on the size or composition of
groups. Before going home, participants attend a training session during which they are shown
how forming a group to pool winnings reduces risk, and how and to what extent the grouping
arrangements will be enforced.
On the second day, participants are rst asked to declare whether they have formed a group
and with whom. Participants in a group have to register together and their intention to form
a group is recorded by the enumerators. After all groups have been declared and agreed on,
3The gambles are expressed in Zimbabwean $. The o¢ cial exchange rate at the time of the experiment was
around Z$55 for US$1 while the black market rate was around 2.5 times that amount. In the areas where the
experiment was conducted and at the time of the experiments, the daily wage for a farm labourer was around
Z$200, similar in magnitude to the average winnings per round from the experiment of Z$158 in round 1 and
Z$172 in round 2.
4The decision to impose equal sharing was not taken lightly as informal risk sharing arrangements in everyday
life are unlikely to have this quality. However, after only one pilot session in the eld, it became clear that the
only way to ensure that the participants focused on who to share with given the enforcement mechanism was to
simplify as much as possible the issue of how to share. The equal sharing rule proved to be the easiest to explain
in terms of the consequences of both joining a group and reneging and was, thus, implemented throughout the
data generating phase of the project.
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each participant proceeds to select one of the six gambles again individually and privately. At
the end of play, winnings are calculated, pooled and shared equally for those in groups, and
privately distributed to all participants.
The verbal framing of the game is kept to a minimum and, as a consequence, the game can
be likened to a variety of real life situations, including risk sharing, which has been extensively
studied in village communities (e.g. Udry 1994, Ligon et al. 2001, Fafchamps and Lund 2003),
and group lending with joint liability (e.g. Karlan 2007, Besley and Coate 1995, Ghatak 1999,
Ghatak 2000).5
To facilitate an analysis of the e¤ect of di¤erent enforcement mechanisms on who groups,
with whom to share risk, three treatments are applied during the experiment. Under treatment
1, sharing is enforced by the experimenter: once participants have declared a group, they cannot
subsequently change their mind, i.e., they cannot refuse to share their second day winnings with
others in their group. So, regardless of the outcomes of all their gambles, their winnings are
pooled and shared equally. Under treatment 2, after having selected a gamble and observed their
individual winnings (but not those of others in their group), participants are o¤ered a chance to
defect from their group, i.e., they can decide to keep their individual winnings. If they opt to do
so, they do not receive a share of the winnings of others in their group. Treatment 3 is similar
to treatment 2 except that participants who elect to keep their individual winnings instead of
sharing have to conrm their decision publicly in front of everyone participating in the same
experimental session. Under each treatment, the consequences of and rules relating to group
formation and defection are explained to participants during the training session on day one.6
The treatments facilitate an analysis of the e¤ect of di¤erent forms of enforcement on who
5There is no lending in our experiment, but participants de facto invest a sure amount (gamble 1) into various
risky investments (gambles 2 to 6, see Table 1).
6No rules were applied to or recommendations made concerning gamble choices within groups.
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shares risk with whom in the following way. In treatment 1, the risk sharing arrangements are
perfectly and exogenously enforced by the experimenter. In treatment 3, defection is public and
can therefore trigger social punishment after the game is completed. Enforcement is extrinsic
in the sense that it relates to the importance that individuals place on their repeated economic
and social interactions within the village and whether and how they think these interactions
might be damaged should they defect publicly during the experiment. In contrast, in treatment
2 defection is private and the identity of a defector is either impossible or di¢ cult to detect.7
In this treatment, enforcement is thus primarily, if not exclusively, based on intrinsic incentives:
altruism, reciprocity, and a desire to avoid feelings of guilt.
Each of the 14 villages studied here was randomly assigned to one of the three treatments.
All the participants in a single village receive the same treatment. Because the total number of
villages is small, possible imbalances may arise between villages. We describe how we deal with
this in the testing strategy section below.
3 Theory and predictions
Our objective is to identify the e¤ects of imperfect enforcement on who shares risk with whom.
This is an empirical contribution, so we do not present a fully specied theoretical model of
group formation for risk sharing. Instead, we combine insights drawn from the already rich
and diverse theoretical and econometric literature on this topic with ethnographic information
pertaining to the villages in our study to generate a series of testable predictions.
First, given the symmetry of the game and the nature of the gamble choice task, it is useful
7Given that participants had only a small number of gambles to choose from, under treatment 2, they may have
been able to draw limited inferences about whether others defected from the amount of money that is distributed
to them at the end of day two. However, as noted by Barr and Genicot (2008), inference is impossible in groups of
size 2 because the other player can always claim to have selected the same gamble and gotten the same outcome.
In groups of 3 or more, it is theoretically possible to infer that someone has defected, but impossible to tell who.
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to consider what groups would be formed among identically risk averse agents. Under perfect
exogenous enforcement, i.e., enforcement by the experimenter, individuals should group as long
as the mutual insurance benet exceeds the costs of group formation. Let (s) denote the
benet derived from joining a group of size s and let the cost of joining the group be c. Cost
c represents the time and e¤ort required, during the 24 hour interval between the two rounds
of the experiment, to agree with others to group and share winnings. For now we assume c to
be the same for all participants. In general, (s) increases with s but at a decreasing rate.8 It
follows that if c > 0 there is an upper limit s on group size determined by 0(s) = c. If c = 0,
it is optimal for all participants to join a single, village-wide group.
Di¤erences between participants in risk attitudes may a¤ect group formation. Assortative
matching by risk attitudes has been discussed in detail by Legros and Newman (2007) in the
context of marriage markets with non-transferable utility. They show that, if the form of risk
sharing is unrestricted, risk averse and risk neutral individuals will marry so that the latter can
insure the former. However, this is precluded in our experiment because we impose equal sharing
of winnings within groups. With equal sharing exogenously imposed, Legros and Newmans
(2007) model predicts positive assortative grouping on risk attitudes.9 Atanasio et al. (2009) nd
support for this prediction among close friends and kin using experimental data from Colombia.
Legros and Newman (2007) do not, however, explore the impact of risk attitudes on the
likelihood that an individual chooses to marry or remain single. In our experiment some par-
8This is most easily shown if we ignore gamble choices. Let yi be individual is winnings and let average
winnings in a group of size s be ys = 1s
Ps
i=1 yi. Given the experimental setting, the yis are i.i.d. Mean
winnings are una¤ected by group size: E[ys] = E[yi] 8s. The variance of ys, however, falls with s: V ar[ys] =
1
s2
Ps
i=1 V ar(yi) =

s
where   V ar(yi). It follows that the utility v(y) of any risk averse individuals increases
in s but at a decreasing rate, i.e., v(ys)  v(ys 1) < v(ys+1)  v(ys) since
V ar[ys 1]  V ar[ys] = 
s  1  

s
> V ar[ys]  V ar[ys+1] = 
s
  
s+ 1
9Athough the authors do not emphasize the fact in their paper, the model presented in Barr and Genicot
(2008) similarly predicts assortative matching on risk attitudes.
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ticipants may choose not to group. If we assume that c is constant across individuals, more
risk averse individuals will be more likely to group as it is they who benet most from mutual
insurance. For risk neutral individuals, the gain from grouping is zero and thus does not exceed
the cost of forming a group as long as c > 0. Combined, these two observations imply that, if
c > 0, multiple risk sharing groups will be observed in each village, participants will sort into
groups with reference to their risk attitudes, and less risk averse individuals may not group or,
put another way, may stay in groups of one. So, our rst prediction concerning who shares risk
with whom is as follows:
Prediction 1: Participants who are more similar with respect to their revealed risk attitudes
are more likely to group to share risk.
In practice, group formation costs c are likely to vary across pairs of individuals (Fafchamps
and Gubert 2007). Some pairs will be more socially proximate, i.e., they will be used to inter-
acting with one another because they are related by blood or marriage, or belong to the same
religious congregation or CBOs. These pairs will have lower group formation costs and, other
things being equal, will be more likely to group (Arcand and Fafchamps, 2010). Pairs who are
similar with respect to gender, age, education, role within the household, and possibly income
and wealth may also face lower group formation costs as they will nd it easier to communicate
and negotiate with one another. So, our second and third predictions concerning who shares
risk with whom are as follows:
Prediction 2: Participants who are more similar in terms of gender, age, education, and
so on are more likely to group together to share risk during the experiment.
Prediction 3: Participants who are socially proximate because they are kin, or belong to
the same religious congregation, or are co-members in CBOs are more likely to group together
to share risk during the experiment.
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So far we have assumed that risk sharing is perfectly enforced. Now we turn to the likely
e¤ects of imperfect enforcement on who shares risk with whom and, hence, to the predictions
that are of principal interest.
In the absence of any enforcement, the best response for a selsh individual is to cheat,
i.e., join a group, take a high risk gamble, share winnings if a low payo¤ is realized, and defect
otherwise. If all participants are selsh and aware of this, no-one will form a group. We therefore
expect groups to be formed only between individuals who face su¢ cient incentives, intrinsic or
extrinsic, not to cheat. This leads to the prediction that there will be less group formation under
imperfect enforcement, i.e., under treatments 2 and 3 as compared to treatment 1. Barr and
Genicot (2008) presented evidence in support of this prediction.
In treatment 2 group formation relies primarily, if not exclusively, on intrinsic incentives.
Given this, we expect participants under treatment 2 to form groups only with others in whom
they trust, possibly owing to mutually held feelings of altruism. Hamilton (1964) hypothesized
that individuals, human or otherwise, exhibit more altruism towards close kin and for non-
human species there is now a considerable body of evidence supporting Hamiltons prediction
(Brembs 2001). Individuals may also be more inclined to trust those with whom they share
religious beliefs and interact frequently via community-based organizations (Platteau, 1994).
Social proximity in the form of kinship, co-religion, and co-memberships in CBOs matter under
treatment 1 because they reduce group formation costs. If, in addition, they form a basis
for altruism and trust, they should be more strongly associated with group formation under
treatment 2 compared to treatment 1. So, our fourth prediction concerning who shares risk
with whom is as follows:
Prediction 4: Social proximity in the form of kinship, co-religion and co-memberships in
CBOs is more strongly associated with risk sharing under treatment 2 as compared to treatment
11
1.
In treatment 3, additional extrinsic incentives are brought into play. Models of repeated
interaction between self-interested agents, e.g., Coate and Ravallion (1993), have shown that
agreements can be enforced by the threat of exclusion from future interactions. Although in our
experiment the risk pooling game is not repeated, under treatment 3 participants have to defect
publicly and this may adversely a¤ect the ongoing relationships they have with other villagers.
Put another way, the public nature of the defections e¤ectively transforms the group formation in
the game into an element in the series of repeated interactions in which the villagers are naturally
engaged (Kocherlakota, 1996). This introduces an additional deterrent against defecting which,
all other things being equal, will make group formation more attractive under treatment 3 as
compared to treatment 2, especially among pairs of individuals who are engaged in ongoing
series of repeated interactions such as co-members in religious congregations and CBOs, and
even more especially when those interactions are voluntary and, thus, jeopardizable.
Based on this reasoning alone, we would expect more grouping and risk sharing under treat-
ment 3 as compared to treatment 2 and less grouping and risk sharing under treatment 3 as
compared to treatment 1. However, this is not what the data show. Barr and Genicot (2008)
nd less group formation under treatment 3 than under treatment 2 and o¤er two possible
explanations, both relating to the fear of jeopardizing ongoing valuable relationships. In one
explanation, participants fear that they may succumb to the temptation to defect publicly on
the spur of the moment owing to inconsistent time preferences and choose not to group in the
rst place as a way of guarding against this temptation. In the other, participants fear that
other group members with whom they have valuable ongoing relationships may succumb to the
temptation and choose not to group in the rst place as a way of guarding against the costly
awkwardness that such a defection would cause. Barr and Genicot (2008) formalize this intuition
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with two theoretical models but o¤er no tests.
Using our rich and diverse dataset, while we cannot distinguish between Barr and Genicots
two explanations, we can conduct a test of what might be referred to as the encompassing
prediction that those engaged in ongoing valuable but jeopardizable or vulnerable voluntary
relationships, while facing a greater deterrent against defection under treatment 3, have more to
loose if one or other is tempted to defect nevertheless and may refrain from grouping in order to
guard against such losses. To do this we need to make a series of informed assumptions about
the value and vulnerability of the various relationships between experimental participants that
are captured in our data.
Kinship and co-religion may be valuable but are unlikely to be vulnerable. Ties between
in-laws are particularly interesting in the Zimbabwean context because they are associated with
many reciprocal obligations and, no matter how displeased one is with ones in-laws (or indeed
ones spouse), these reciprocal obligations remain and the repeated interaction continues (Holle-
man, 1969).10 Members of the same church may be friends but even if they are not or cease to
be following some disagreement their tie of co-religion is likely to remain in place. Indeed, being
of the same religion may provide a basis for reconciliation.
In comparison, co-memberships in CBOs are likely to be both valuable and vulnerable.
They are valuable because of the vital role that CBOs play in helping villagers solve problems
associated with missing markets and public good provision. And they are vulnerable in the
sense that each villager is free to leave a CBO if he or she wishes to do so and the collective
membership can expel or fractionalize if su¢ cient agreement to do so is reached. In Zimbabwe,
though rare, expulsions and fractionalizations are not unheard of. Thus, co-memberships in
10Marriage and divorce are voluntary in some societies including the one under investigation. However, our
experimental design restricted participation to a single participant per household, thereby precluding married
couples from both participating. So, in our dataset kinship corresponds to genetic relatedness and to being
in-laws.
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CBOs correspond to the jeopardizable voluntary relationships to which Barr and Genicot allude
and the following prediction can be made:
Prediction 5: Co-members in CBOs withdraw from group formation under treatment 3 as
compared to treatments 1 and 2.
Finally, returning to the analysis of kinship and co-religion presented above, note that these
ties may provide a support for group formation under treatment 3. To the extent that they
are valuable, their value is likely to be eroded by defection and this serves as an enforcement
mechanism. However, they are robust and could potentially provide a basis for reconciliation in
the event of a defection. Thus, with a degree of circumspection owing to its origins, we propose
one further prediction:
Prediction 6: Social proximity in the form of kinship and co-religion is more strongly
associated with risk sharing under treatment 3 as compared to treatment 1.
4 Testing strategy
We do not have detailed information about the negotiations that took place between the par-
ticipants during the group formation process and, this being the case, we are restricted to a
reduced-form analysis. The other constraint placed upon us by our data relates to sample size;
for example, we have too few observations to e¤ectively explore non-linearities in the data.
Bearing these constraints in mind, we adopt the approach to group formation analysis pro-
posed by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) and Arcand and Fafchamps (2010).11 This approach
uses network notation to represent groups and relies on the estimation of dyadic regression
11Readers who would like to see a simple Probit analysis of who groups that takes individual and village-level
characteristics as explanatory variables should refer to Barr and Genicot (2008).
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models of the general form:
mij = (xij)
where mij = 1 if i is in a risk sharing group with individual j, and 0 otherwise; and (:)
denotes the logit function. E[mij ] increases with factors that make i (or j) more likely to group.
E[mij ] also increases in factors that make i more likely to group with j, such as similarity, social
proximity, or prior experience of co-grouping.
The mijs are not independent of each other and, this being the case, one may be tempted to
base the estimation on a joint maximum likelihood function. However, there are several problems
with this approach. First, the estimation would require solving a complicated optimization
problem with multiple integrals. This could, in principle, be achieved using the Gibbs algorithm,
but at a non-negligible cost in terms of programming. Second and more importantly, writing
down the joint likelihood function would force the researcher to specify the functional form of the
interactions between observations. Theoretically, this could improve e¢ ciency, but it could also
result in inconsistent estimates if the specied form of the interaction were wrong. So, we opt
for a simpler and more transparent approach whereby we regress mij on a vector of ij-specic
regressors applying a logit and correct for interdependence across observations using the method
suggested by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) for dyadic regressions. Train (2003) recommends
a similar logit approach to model multiple choice decisions (in our case, whom i groups with)
whenever each choice depends in the same way on choice-specic regressors.
As noted by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), the estimation of dyadic models requires some
care regarding the way regressors are incorporated. In our case, the network matrixM  [mij ] is
symmetrical since mij = mji by construction. Hence, to ensure that E[mij ] = E[mji] regressors
must enter the model in a symmetric form, i.e., such that xij = xji. For individual-specic
regressors xi and xjone simple way of satisfying this requirement is to enter regressors in the
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form (xi+xj) and jxi xj j. As well as being simple, this approach leads to readily interpretable
results. The coe¢ cient on jxi   xj j captures assortative matching: if the coe¢ cient is negative,
it indicates that the more individuals di¤er with respect to variable x the less likely they are
to be in the same group. The coe¢ cient of (xi + xj) captures the direct e¤ect of variable x on
E[mij ], that is, on the likelihood of joining a (larger) group. See Fafchamps and Gubert (2007)
for details.12
Taking all these factors into account, we estimate a model of the following form:
mij = (0 + 1tij + 2dij + 3(tij  dij)
+4jzi   zj j+ 5(zi + zj)) (1)
where: dij is a vector of the characteristics of the relationship between individuals i and j,
i.e., kinship and co-membership in religions and CBOs, and dij > 0 indicates the presence of a
given relationship, dij = 0 its absence; tij is a vector of treatment dummies; zi is a vector of
the relevant characteristics of individual i including his or her gender, age, education, income,
wealth, and as a proxy for their risk attitudes, their gamble choice g1i = f1; :::6g in round 1; and
the s are parameters to be estimated.
Before we proceed any further, note that our ability to identify the predicted e¤ects by
estimating model (1) depends on the experiment not being embedded within an ongoing,
community-wide risk sharing arrangement in every village. If the experiment is perfectly em-
bedded within a community-wide risk sharing equilibrium with perfect truth-telling, grouping
to share risk within the experiment is superuous, i.e., brings no additional risk sharing benet
to participants. Hence, if the cost of forming a group for the experiment were positive, however
12When, in addition, each node i has the same number of links (which is not the case here), it is not possible to
identify factors that make it more likely for i to have more links. This renders the regressors of the form (xi+xj)
redundant.
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small, we would observe no group formation and, hence, all the coe¢ cients in (1) would be
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Provided this is not the case, we can rule out perfect
embeddedness, in which case experimental features do matter and can be used to draw inference
about underlying behavioral determinants.
We use model (1) to test the predictions presented in the previous section. Signicant
elements in 1, identify the impact of the treatments on the likelihood of an individual joining
a group. Since treatment 1 is the omitted category, a negative coe¢ cient on treatment 2 and
a larger negative coe¢ cient on treatment 3 would be consistent with the ndings of Barr and
Genicot (2008).
The sign and signicance of coe¢ cients 2; 3; and 4 provide information regarding the
e¤ects of group formation costs and intrinsic and extrinsic motivations on who groups with
whom. A signicantly positive 2 supports Prediction 3 as it provides evidence that group
formation costs are important and decline with social proximity dij . A signicantly negative 4
corresponding to characteristic z supports Prediction 2 as it provides evidence that is and
js who are more similar in terms of z are more likely to join the same group. Further, if the
element in 4 that corresponds to the dyadic di¤erence in risk attitudes, jg1i   g1j j, is signicant
and negative it supports Prediction 1 as it provides evidence that is and js who are more
similar in terms of their risk attitudes are more likely to group together.
Signicant elements in 3, the coe¢ cients on the interaction terms tijdij , indicate that the
importance of di¤erent types of social proximity varies across treatments. Since treatment 1 is
the omitted category, a signicant positive 3 for treatment 2 dij provides evidence in support
of Prediction 4, that social proximity facilitates group formation when enforcement depends
on intrinsic incentives alone. A signicant positive 3 for treatment 3 dij is evidence that the
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social proximity and repeated interactions associated with dij support social enforcement.13 A
signicant negative coe¢ cient on the interaction between treatment 3 and co-memberships in
CBOs provides support for Prediction 5. Signicant positive coe¢ cients on the interaction
between treatment 3 and kinship and treatment 3 and co-religion provide support forPrediction
6. A signicant negative 3 indicates that individuals are choosing to protect the social ties and
repeated interactions associated with a specic type of social proximity from the consequences
of someone defecting in public during the experiment.
Finally, signicant elements in 5 identify characteristics associated with joining larger
groups or with joining a group rather than staying a singleton.14 The term 5(zi + zj) are
included primarily as controls. However, it is useful to note that a signicantly negative coef-
cient on g1i + g
1
j provides evidence that less risk averse individuals are less likely to join risk
sharing groups.
Winnings wi from round 1 are also included in z. If participants see winning as an indication
of acumen or luck and if these attributes are universally valued, this could lead to assorting on
rst round winnings and a negative and signicant coe¢ cient on jwi   wj j. If participants who
were lucky in the rst round think they do not need insurance in the second round and, so,
choose not to group, we would observe a negative coe¢ cient on (wi + wj).15
Model (1) is estimated using a logit. As emphasized earlier, it is essential to correct stan-
dard errors for non-independence across observations. Non-independence arises principally be-
cause residuals from dyadic observations involving the same individual i or j are correlated,
negatively or positively, with each other. Standard errors can be corrected for this type of non-
independence either by clustering by village, as in Arcand and Fafchamps (2010), or by applying
13Under treatment 3, reputational considerations in general should raise 2, the coe¢ cient on the treatment
dummy, but should not generate any signicant interaction term.
14To see why, suppose that individuals with a large value of z form larger groups. This implies that E[mij ] is
an increasing function of zi + zj and hence that 5 is positive.
15A negative coe¢ cient on (wi + wj) could also potentially result from a wealth or income e¤ect.
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the method proposed by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007). Both approaches correct for possible
non-independence within dyadic pairs sharing a common i or j. Clustering by village also cor-
rects for other forms of non-independence across dyads participating in the same experimental
session. However, the estimates of the standard errors that the second approach returns are
consistent only when the number of villages is large.16 Given that we have data from only 14
villages, we use the method proposed by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007).
As treatments are randomly assigned to villages, it should not be necessary to control for
village characteristics. However, because the number of villages is small, unbalancedness across
villages is a concern (see Table A1 in the appendix). To correct for this, village xed e¤ects are
included in some specications.
5 The data
The experiments were conducted in 2001 in 23 Zimbabwean villages. However, in this paper
we use the data from only 14. Of the remaining 9, three were assigned to a control treatment
in which no group formation was allowed and 6 were not fully enumerated during the various
surveys upon which we draw. The control treatment villages contain no information about group
formation and are thus dropped from the analysis presented here. The 6 villages that were not
fully enumerated have incomplete information regarding household income, wealth, kinship,
religion and memberships in CBOs. When we cross the data to generate dyadic observations,
incompleteness leads to a massive loss in usable experimental observations, raising the possibility
of selection bias. For this reason we prefer to omit these villages from our analysis. Since villages
were randomly assigned to treatments, this should not a¤ect the validity of our inference.
16Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) provide simulation results showing that when the number of clusters is
less than 30, clustering may result in incorrect standard errors.
19
Of the 14 villages in our sample, 10 were established in the early 1980s as part of a land
redistribution programme. These resettled villages are relatively small and geographically con-
centrated. Owing to the randomness of the settler selection process, inhabitants of these villages
are less likely to be genetically related than members of non-resettled villages. However, in the
large majority of cases they have lived in the same village for more than a decade, they engage
in more associational activity and share more marriage ties (Barr 2004, Dekker 2004).
Data on each participants characteristics, such as age, gender, years of education and their
position within the household, were collected at the time of the experiment. These data are
complemented by survey data relating to the participantshouseholds. The household surveys
were conducted prior to the experiments, so any variables generated using the survey data cannot
be inuenced by the outcomes of the experiment.
As measures of household income and wealth, we use the variables constructed by Trudy
Owens and Hans Hoogeveen on the basis of the 1999 round of the Zimbabwe Rural House-
hold Dynamics Study (ZRHDS) collected by Bill Kinsey. Wealth is measured in terms of live-
stock. Kinsey, Burger and Gunning (1998), Gunning, Hoddinott, Kinsey and Owens (2000), and
Hoogeveen and Kinsey (2001) discuss this dataset in detail.
The data on memberships in various religious groups and community-based organizations
(CBOs) are drawn from a survey by Barr in 2000 that focused on the same households and
individuals therein (see Barr (2004) for details). In the case of the latter, we focus on co-
memberships in CBOs with an explicit economic purpose, e.g., micro-nance, mutual insurance,
funeral societies, irrigation and livestock rearing cooperatives as it is these that are both valuable
and voluntary.
Our data on family and marriage ties are derived from a specically designed social mapping
exercise conducted in 1999 and 2001 by village focus groups involving at least one representative
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from each household residing in each village (Dekker 2004). In the analysis, genetic relatedness
is captured by a dummy variable taking the value 1 for relatives and zero otherwise. Relatedness
by marriage is captured by a second dummy variable taking the value 1 for dyads related by
marriage but not genetically and zero otherwise.
6 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the characteristics of the 382 participants who took part in both rounds of the
experiment in the 14 villages.17 These observations form the basis for our analysis. The sample
is evenly split between men and women. The average participant is middle-aged and has slightly
more than primary education. Two thirds are married and are either household heads or the
spouses of household heads. Both annual household monetary income and livestock wealth are
approximately log-normally distributed and are incorporated into the analysis in log form.18
The majority of participants belong to a religious community, most often one of the many local
apostolic religions existing in Zimbabwe. On average, participants belong to between three and
four economic CBOs.
Also reported in Table 2 are the proportions of the sample playing under each of the treat-
ments, the proportion who joined groups, the average gamble choices in each round of the
experiment, and the average winnings per participant in each round. Across the sample, just
under half of the participants join sharing groups in the second round of the experiment and
average group size is 3.17. Figure 1 presents a histogram of the size of group joined by each
17Of the participants in the rst round in these villages, 19 did not turn up on the second day, sending a
replacement from the same household in their stead. Because we do not have rst round gamble choice data for
the replacements, they are excluded from the analysis that follows. However, if we do not control for gamble choice
in the group formation logits and include the replacements, the other ndings remain qualitatively unchanged.
18To avoid losing observations with no income or livestock wealth, we use log(crop income+1) and log(livestock
wealth+1). Livestock wealth is measured in money terms using local market prices and household data on numbers
of livestock of di¤erent types.
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participant under each of the three treatments. Participants who do not join a group appear
on the left as groupsof size 1. Groups are small even under treatment 1 and are smaller still
under treatments 2 and 3. Further, as shown by Barr and Genicot (2008), the propensity to
group is lowest under treatment 3 when extrinsic incentives are allowed to come into play.
Several other individual-level descriptive statistics relating to the experiment are worth men-
tioning even though they are not apposite to our predictions. First, 48 and 46 percent of the
participants won the higher payo¤ from their gambles in rounds 1 and 2 respectively and win-
ning the higher payo¤ was not correlated across the rounds. These statistics indicate that the
gambles were fair and independent.19 Second, few participants reneged during the experiment:
under treatment 2, 37 participants joined groups, 15 of those went on to win high payo¤s and,
thus, may have been tempted to defect, but only 3 did so; under treatment 3, 45 participants
joined groups, 24 of these went on to win high payo¤s, but only one defected. With so few
defections, it is impossible to investigate their determinants. However, the descriptives suggest
that participants were quite adept at identifying trustworthy partners and tended not to be
tempted to defect, especially in public.20
Table 3 presents the characteristics of all the possible pairs or dyads of participants that can
be made out of the 382 individual participants. By possible pairs or dyadswe mean dyads
that could have chosen to join the same risk sharing group within the experiment. These are all
within-village dyads as, by design, between-village dyads could not group together.
Only 7% of all possible dyads joined the same risk sharing group. Even under treatment 1
where there was perfect exogenous enforcement, only 12% of the dyads joined the same group.21
19Post-play, group discussions indicated that, while the participants did not have a good grasp of the notion of
independence, they did consider the gambles to be unxable and fair.
20 Interestingly, the one defector under treatment 3 was a visitor to the village in which she played. She was
scheduled to and indeed did get on a bus back to the nearby town only a few hours after the second session was
completed.
21Treatment 2 is under-represented in the dyadic sample because villages had to be dropped owing to incomplete
data.
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Straight away this suggests that either the equal sharing rule deterred participants with dis-
similar risk preferences from grouping together or group formation costs and enforcement issues
a¤ected grouping decisions.
Only 20% of the dyads belong to the same religious group. This reects the diversity of
faiths present in each of the villages. According to our data the number of religions within each
village varies from 4 to 13 with 20 to 30 being represented in the dataset as a whole.22 It was
because of this diversity that we decided to treat co-religion as a tie in the same way we treat
co-memberships in CBOs as ties rather than treating it as a personal characteristic.
The average dyad has approximately one co-membership in an economic CBO, although
the maximum number of co-memberships in economic CBOs is 9. Owing to the prevalence of
resettled villages in our sample and the fact that each household could send only one participant
to the experiments, only 2 percent of the dyads in our sample are genetically related. Relatedness
by marriage is more commonplace: 19 percent of the dyads are related by marriage. Dekker
(2004) proposes and nds support for the notion that, in the resettled villages, marriage has
been used to create social ties between households.23
Since the gamble choice variable g1i takes values from 1 to 6, the maximum di¤erence in
gamble choice is 5 and the maximum sum is 12. The average absolute di¤erence in gamble
choices is 1.23. The average di¤erence in round 1 winnings within dyads is 116 Zimbabwean
dollars and the average sum of round 1 winnings is 324 Zimbabwean dollars.
22We cannot be more accurate about the total number of religions because, in each village, local church or
congregation names rather than generic names were sought in the rst stage of the data collection in order to
maximize the accuracy of the second stage.
23We have no information on geographical proximity. However, the study villages are small and geographically
concentrated, i.e., not interspersed with elds. The majority of participants have lived in the same village for one
or two decades: Gans (1968) and Michaelson (1976) both nd that the importance of geographical proximity as
a determinant of tie formation declines over time.
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7 Econometric analysis
Coe¢ cient estimates and corresponding standard errors for model (1) are presented in Table
4. All standard errors and corresponding indicators of signicance are corrected for dyadic
clustering. The logit model in the rst column includes two treatment dummies (treatment 1
is the basis for comparison) and the four social tie variables described above but no interaction
terms. This model identies the raw treatment e¤ects 1tij . The logit model in the second
column also includes the interaction terms 3(tij  dij) and provides the rst set of test results
relating to our six predictions. The signicance of the coe¢ cients on the interaction terms
included in the regressions tell us whether the e¤ects on grouping of each social tie in treatments
2 and 3 di¤er from its e¤ect in treatment 1. To establish whether each social tie has a signicant
e¤ect on grouping in either treatment 2 or treatment 3, we have to test whether the sum of the
coe¢ cient on the appropriate interaction term and the coe¢ cient on the social tie in treatment
1 is signicant. This is what the linear restriction tests reported at the bottom of the table do.
In the third column the uninteracted treatment dummies are replaced by a full set of village
dummies. This model provides a second set of test results. Once again, linear restriction test
results are also reported.
Before turning to the results pertaining to our six predictions, note that one of the treatment
dummies is statistically signicant in columns 1 and 2. This rules out perfect embeddedness of
the experiment within an ongoing community-wide risk sharing arrangement.24 Once again, in
accordance with Barr and Genicot (2008), there is signicantly less group formation under treat-
ment 3, when social sanctioning is possible. Treatment 2 is intermediate in terms of its impact
on group formation but, in the presence of all the controls, it is statistically indistinguishable
24Post play interviews with participants in the control villages where group formation was not proposed by
the experimenter provide further evidence against perfect embeddedness; in none of the control villages did
participants spontaneously agree to share winnings amongst themselves.
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from treatment 1.
7.1 Results
Prediction 1: The di¤erence in round 1 gamble choices, jg1i   g1j j, is never signicant. So,
Prediction 1 is not supported: group formation in the experiment is not assortative with respect
to risk attitudes.25 The sum of round 1 gamble choices, g1i + g
1
j , is also never signicant. This
indicates that risk averse individuals are no more likely to join sharing groups or to form larger
groups.26 The coe¢ cient on the sum of round 1 winnings, wi + wj , is negative and signicant
in column 1 suggesting that participants who won more in round 1 are less likely to group in
round 2. However, this result is not robust to the inclusion of the village xed e¤ects.
Prediction 2: All three models in Table 4 provide strong evidence of assortative grouping
with respect to gender, i.e., the coe¢ cient on the dyadic di¤erences in gender is negative and
highly signicant. This is consistent with Prediction 2 which states that participants are more
likely to group with others who are similar to themselves. This may be because, for them, group
formation is less costly.27
Prediction 3: The model in column 1 indicates that, on average across all treatments,
genetically related dyads are more likely to group. However, the coe¢ cient on this variable
uninteracted is insignicant in columns 2 and 3, indicating that genetic relatedness is not sig-
nicantly associated with grouping under treatment 1, i.e., when only group formation costs
are important. The linear restriction tests in columns 2 and 3 indicate that genetic relatedness
25 In a similar experiment, but involving only treatment 2 and conducted in Colombia Attanasio et al (2009)
found evidence of assorting on risk attitudes, but only among close family and friends. We cannot seek to replicate
their nding owing to the fact that we have no data on ties of friendship. Other factors that may have contributed
to Attanasio et als relative success in identifying this e¤ect are the size of their sample, over 80,000 dyads with
almost 4,500 of these being close family or friends, and the greater variation in their participants gamble choices.
26There is also no evidence of assortative matching on risk preferences even when the analysis is restricted to
the sub-sample assigned to treatment 1, i.e, group formation under external enforcement.
27Barr, Dekker and Fafchamps (2009) show that assorting with respect to gender is not owing to trust: there
is least gender assorting under treatment 2 when trust matters most.
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has a signicant e¤ect on group formation under treatment 3, where its cost-lowering capacity
is combined with its capacity to support enforcement based on social sanctions, even though
neither of these capacities is su¢ cient to generate a signicant e¤ect on its own.
Once the village dummies are introduced, there is evidence that co-memberships in economic
CBOs increase the likelihood of grouping together under treatment 1. This nding is consistent
with Prediction 3 and suggests that prior experience of grouping together voluntarily leads to
lower group formation costs.
Prediction 4: Only one of the interaction terms involving the treatment 2 dummy is
signicant and, even then, in only one of the models. Prior to the introduction of village
dummies, i.e., in column 2, co-memberships in economic CBOs are associated with an increased
likelihood of grouping together under treatment 2 both in absolute terms and as compared to
treatment 1. This ndings is consistent with Prediction 4. However, this e¤ect is not observed
in column 3. The introduction of village dummies alters the apparent nature of the e¤ect of
CBO co-memberships on group formation from being trust-based to cost-based. We will return
to this issue below.
Prediction 5: The coe¢ cient on the interaction term between the treatment 3 dummy
and co-memberships in economic CBOs is negative, signicant and robust to the inclusion or
exclusion of the village dummy variables. This is consistent with Prediction 5. However, the size
of this e¤ect varies between columns 2 and 3. The model in column 2 indicates that the desire
to protect these valuable ongoing relationships from the possible e¤ects of a public defection
signicantly outweighs their e¤ect on the cost of group formation and trust, whereas the model
in column 3 indicates that the desire to protect these relationships simply cancels out their e¤ect
on the cost of group formation and trust.
Prediction 6: The coe¢ cients on the interaction terms between the treatment 3 dummy
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and co-religion and the treatment 3 dummy and marriage ties are positive, signicant and robust
to the inclusion or exclusion of the village dummy variables. In addition, as mentioned above,
genetic relatedness supports group formation under treatment 3, where its cost-lowering capacity
is combined with its capacity to support enforcement based on social sanctions. These ndings
are consistent with Prediction 6 and indicate that co-religion and kinship, especially marriage
ties, support enforcement based on social sanctioning.
8 Summary and discussion
The aim of this paper was to investigate the extent to which available enforcement mechanisms
a¤ect who shares risk with whom. Our approach was to apply dyadic regression analysis to data
from a specically designed behavioral experiment, two surveys, and a genealogical mapping
exercise all undertaken in the same villages. The experimental element in the research design was
critical as it excluded any causal inuence running from who was sharing risk with whom to the
enforcement mechanism adopted. Three treatments were applied during the experiment, each
corresponding to a di¤erent enforcement mechanism: perfect enforcement by an outside party;
enforcement through intrinsic incentives such as altruism and mutual trust; and enforcement
through extrinsic incentives arising from the fear of social punishment possibly in the form of
exclusion from future interactions.
Combining insights from the rich and diverse theoretical literature on risk sharing with
ethnographic information pertaining to the context in which we conducted the experiment we
derived six predictions concerning who would share risk with whom during the experiment and
how this would vary across the three enforcement mechanisms.
Five out of the six predictions received at least some support from the data: in accordance
with Prediction 2, participants of the same gender were more likely to group together to share
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risk; in accordance with Prediction 3, there is weak evidence that genetic relatedness and co-
memberships in CBOs serving an economic purpose support risk sharing under treatment 1,
although in each case the identication of the e¤ect depends critically on the model estimated;
in accordance with Prediction 4, co-memberships in CBOs may be of greater support to risk
sharing under treatment 2, i.e., when trust is important, although once again this nding is not
robust across model specications; in accordance with Prediction 5, those with co-memberships
in CBOs serving an economic purpose withdrew from grouping under treatment 3, i.e., when
social punishments could be used to enforce grouping to share risk; and in accordance with
Prediction 6, kinship, especially in the form of marriage ties, and co-religion are more strongly
associated with risk sharing under Treatment 3 compared to Treatment 1, i.e., when grouping
to share risk is enforced by the experimenter.
The analysis depended on the estimation of a reduced form model of group formation. How-
ever, the ndings are consistent with group formation being easier or less costly between indi-
viduals of the same sex and, possibly between kin and those who share more co-memberships
in CBOs serving an economic purpose. That, according to our data, similarities in age, within-
household status, education, income, wealth, and marital status are not associated with an
increased likelihood of grouping is also worthy of note. It suggests that the villages included in
our study are very cohesive and inclusive. However, before being presented as a conclusion, this
nding needs to be corroborated by further research focusing on the groups and networks that
are formed in everyday life, as for instance undertaken by Barr, Dekker and Fafchamps (2010c).
Co-memberships in CBOs serving an economic purpose may also provide a basis for mutual
trust. However, here, in particular, the perturbing of the result when village dummies are
added to the model needs some consideration. The density of each of the four types of social
ties included in our models varies signicantly across villages, with the variation being most
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signicant in the case of co-memberships in economic CBOs. This is undoubtedly leading to
problems of identication and indicates that future studies should involve a larger number of
villages, reduce the number of treatments applied, or aim to match the village samples across
treatments rather than assigning treatments randomly.
Because there are so few kin relations in the sample, we are perhaps not too surprised that
results fail to show ties of kinship to embody trust. However, we remain disappointed with our
null nding concerning the role of co-religion in supporting trust. Here, once again, we suspect
that low power owing to small sample size is the origin of the problem.
Finally, it is probably appropriate to mention that we regret choosing not to collect data
on friendship as this, more than any other form of social tie is likely to embody trust. At the
time when we conducted the experiments reported here, we had not discovered how easy it is
to collect data on who, within an experimental session, recognizes whom as a friend.
Our ndings concerning which type of social ties support informal enforcement based on
social sanctioning and which are protected from the consequences of social sanctions having to
be applied are considerably more robust. Co-religion provides a foundation for enforcement based
on social sanctioning, possibly because of religious traditions about transgressions, admissions,
contrition and forgiveness. Marriage ties between in-laws also provide a basis for enforcement
through social sanctioning, although, here, contrition and forgiveness would seem less likely to
be involved.
Finally, pairs of participants who, through their co-memberships in CBOs serving an eco-
nomic purpose, are engaged in highly valued but vulnerable repeated exchanges are more likely
to group when a third party is enforcing the contract or the contract is supported by trust alone
but withdraw from group formation when there is a risk of public defections. Sadly, our data did
not allow us to distinguish between the two explanations that Barr and Genicot (2008) proposed
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and so it remains up to other researchers to establish whether it is the fear of oneself or others
being tempted to renege publicly on a new informal contract that looms largest in the minds of
those who withdraw from setting up such new contracts.
Despite being unable to establish which of these fears looms largest, we view the evidence
in support of Barr and Genicots (2008) theoretical explanations as to why less risk sharing was
observed under treatment 3 compared to treatment 2 as our most important contribution. This
is because it highlights a weakness in some widely accepted theories of risk sharing and provides
support for a previously unacknowledged explanation as to why many apparently benecial
interactions do not take place. It suggests that villagers are very protective of their valued series
of repeated interactions and take the potential impact of any prospective interaction on their
tried and tested ones into account when such new prospects emerge.
In addition, the fact that it is co-memberships in economic CBOs that are protected in
this way provides direct evidence of the value of CBOs that is not subject to concerns about
endogeneity. Such evidence is rare and renders the recent reports indicating that Zimbabwean
civil society has su¤ered from the extreme pressure placed upon it since we conducted our
experiments all the more lamentable. A follow-up study in six of the villages included in the
analysis above shows that 73 percent of the CBOs enumerated in 2000 no longer exist.
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Table 1. Gamble choices in Z$ and implied relative risk aversion coefficients
Choice High payoff Prob. Low payoff Prob. EV RA class RA coeff.
1 100 50% 100 50% 100 Extreme infinity to 7.51
2 190 50% 90 50% 140 Severe 7.51 to 1.74
3 240 50% 80 50% 160 Intermediate 1.74 to 0.81
4 300 50% 60 50% 180 Moderate 0.81 to 0.32
5 380 50% 20 50% 200 Slight-neutral 0.32 to 0.00
6 400 50% 0 50% 200 Neutral-negative 0 to -ve infinity
Table 2. Characteristics of participants
Mean Std. Dev.
Subject Characteristics
Female 52%
Age 41.97 17.75
Years of schooling 6.76 3.21
Household head 42%
Spouse of household head 21%
Married 66%
Annual income (Zim$) 2,562         3,374          
Value of livestock wealth (Zim$) 11,656       10,124        
Belongs to a religious community 88%
Memberships in economic groups 3.30 2.85
Genetic relatives in same session 0.77 1.45
Relatives by marriage in same session 5.92 6.61
Resettled household 76%
Experimental variables
Played under treatment 1 42%
Played under treatment 2 23%
Played under treatment 3 35%
Joined a group in round 2 49%
Group size (singletons included) 3.17 3.01
Gamble choice in round 1 3.23 1.17
Winnings in round 1 157.13 106.60
Observations 382
Table 3. Characteristics of all possible participant dyads
Mean Std. Dev.
Co-grouping in the experiment 
Chose to join same group in experiment 7%
  Chose to join same group under treatment 1 12%
  Chose to join same group under treatment 2 8%
  Chose to join same group under treatment 3 2%
Prior social proximity:
Belong to same religious group 19%
Co-memberships in economic groups 0.940 1.134
Related by blood 2%
Related by marriage 19%
Treatments:
Treatment 1 (perfect, exogenous enforcement) 44%
Treatment 2 (intrinsic enforcement only) 16%
Treatment 3 (intrinsic and endogenous extrinsic) 40%
Gambles:
Difference in Round 1 gamble choice 1.230 1.066
Sum of Round 1 gamble choices 6.466 1.621
Round 1 winnings:
Difference in Round 1 winnings 116.457 95.794
Sum of Round 1 winnings 323.597 150.778
Observations 10470
Table 4. Dyadic regressions on membership in the same risk pooling group
(1) (2) (3)
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
Social proximity
Belong to same religious group [R] 0.176 0.176 0.044 0.191 0.056 0.187
Co-memberships in economic CBOs [C] 0.101 0.066 0.108 0.074 0.133 0.074 *
Genetically related [G] 0.581 0.306 * 0.433 0.476 0.359 0.486
Related by marriage [M] 0.037 0.240 -0.094 0.259 -0.154 0.272
Treatment effects 
T2 (intrinsic motivations only) -0.231 0.392 -0.523 0.461
T3 (intrinsic and endogenous extrinsic) -1.804 0.309 *** -1.938 0.374 ***
Treatment effects interacted with social proximity
T2 x Belong to same religious group (T2 x R) -0.200 0.518 0.344 0.537
T2 x Co-memberships in economic CBOs (T2 x C) 0.400 0.203 ** 0.146 0.206
T2 x Genetically related (T2 x G) -0.188 0.743 -0.315 0.842
T2 x Related by marriage (T2 x M) -0.198 0.590 -0.444 0.579
T3 x Belong to same religious group (T3 x R) 0.893 0.421 ** 1.082 0.436 **
T3 x Co-memberships in economic CBOs (T3 x C) -0.485 0.193 ** -0.343 0.183 *
T3 x Genetically related (T3 x G) 1.115 0.769 1.229 0.868
T3 x Related by marriage (T3 x M) 1.073 0.583 * 1.093 0.634 *
Experimental variables
Difference in round 1 gamble choices 0.045 0.081 0.042 0.082 -0.009 0.087
Sum of round 1 gambles 0.063 0.055 0.068 0.055 0.052 0.056
Diff. in round 1 winnings ('00s of Zim$) 7.3e-5 0.001 0.000 0.001 8.2e-5 0.001
Sum of round 1 winnings ('00s of Zim$) -0.001 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001
Difference in individual characteristics
Difference in gender -1.895 0.347 *** -1.914 0.343 *** -1.955 0.339 ***
Difference in age -0.013 0.009 -0.014 0.009 -0.017 0.009 *
Difference in head or spouse dummy -0.214 0.172 -0.210 0.175 -0.184 0.178
Difference in years of schooling 0.017 0.030 0.018 0.030 0.025 0.029
Difference in log of household income 0.092 0.093 0.093 0.087 0.068 0.062
Difference in log of livestock wealth 0.028 0.047 0.023 0.045 0.008 0.042
Sum of individual characteristics
Sum of female dummies 0.128 0.140 0.120 0.143 0.029 0.154
Sum of ages 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.007
Sum of head and spouse dummies -0.100 0.196 -0.108 0.195 0.123 0.198
Sum of years of schooling 0.038 0.032 0.034 0.031 0.061 0.032 *
Sum of log household income -0.061 0.080 -0.055 0.074 -0.016 0.065
Sum of log of livestock wealth 0.053 0.049 0.047 0.047 0.002 0.043
Intercept -2.576 1.579 -2.384 1.517 -2.218 1.342 *
Village dummies included no no yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.177 0.189 0.227
Linear restriction tests (F-tests, significance levels tabulated)
(T2 x R) + R
(T2 x C) + C
(T2 x G) + G
(T2 x M) + M
(T3 x R) + R
(T3 x C) + C
(T3 x G) + G
(T3 x M) + M
Observations 10470 10470 10470
**
*
Notes: All standard errors adjusted to account for dyadic non-independence; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at  5%; * significant 
at 10%.
ns
ns
ns
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ns
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Table A1. Characteristics of participants across treatments
T1 T2 T3
T1 and T2 T2 and T3 T1 and T3
Participant characteristics
Female 53% 48% 53%
Age 41.0 43.0 42.0
Years of schooling 6.7 6.5 7.0
Household head 38% 53% 40% ** *
Spouse of household head 23% 15% 25% *
Married 65% 66 69%
Annual income (Zim$) 2745 2163 2607
Value of livestock wealth (Zim$) 12344 10795 11412
Belongs to a religious community 86% 86% 90%
Memberships in economic CBO 2.63 1.52 2.41 *** ***
Genetic relatives in same session 0.53 1.16 0.80 *** **
Relatives by marriage in same session 5.64 3.85 7.62
Experimental variables
Gamble choice Round 1 3.23 3.45 3.09 **
Winnings Round 1 161 151 158
Winnings Round 2 168 156 175
Joined a group in Round 2 65% 42% 34% *** ***
Group size in Round 2 4.7 2.7 1.7 *** *** ***
Dyadic characteristics
Belong to same religious group 19% 21% 20%
Co-memberships in economic CBOs 0.980 0.718 0.986 *** ***
Genetically related 2% 4% 2% *** ***
Related by marriage 18% 18% 21% *** ***
Notes: *** difference significant at 1%; ** difference significant at  5%; * difference significant at 10%
Difference between:
